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STUDENT PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Susan G. Archambault*
INTRODUCTION

Schools are increasingly relying on the
educational technology industry (EdTech) for cloud
computing services, online applications, and data
analytics tools. In 2017, more than half of K-12
students used Google’s education apps, and over 95%
of U.S. K-8 schools use ClassDojo for sharing
photographs and videos of students. 1 A 2013 study
found that 95% of districts relied on cloud services
for a variety of functions, including data mining
related to student performance, support for
classroom activities, student guidance, data hosting,
cafeteria payments, and transportation planning. 2
Educational technology can offer many benefits for

*Susan Gardner Archambault is Head of the Reference
and Instruction Department in the William H. Hannon Library at
Loyola Marymount University (LMU). She has published and
presented extensively on topics related to information literacy and
academic library assessment. She is currently a doctoral student in
LMU’s Educational Leadership for Social Justice program, where
her research explores algorithmic literacy.
1
Amy Rhoades, Comment Big Tech Makes Big Data Out
of Your Child: The FERPA Loophole EdTech Exploits to Monetize
Student Data, 9 AM. U. BUS. L. REV., 445, 453-454 (2020).
2
Joel Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russell, Jordan Kovnot,
Thomas B. Norton, Ryan Cloutier & Daniela Alvarado, Privacy
and Cloud Computing in Public Schools, 2 CENTER ON LAW AND
INFORMATION POLICY, 1, 17 (2013),
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/clip/2/.
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schools, including discounted or free services, more
efficient and effective teaching through classroom
monitoring and management, more personalized
learning, and easier and faster communication.3
EdTech companies can also use student attendance
data to allocate truancy resources, inform policy
making, and make curriculum decisions. 4
The Department of Education has encouraged
schools to use "big data" to improve assessment and
educational innovation. 5 Schools are attracted to
companies like Google for giving away free products
such as Google Workspace for Education (formerly
GAFE, or Google Apps for Education, and later
renamed G Suite Enterprise for Education; it is a webbased service that includes student email accounts,
calendars, document storage, and more). 6 The Google
tools are used by more than 30 million students,
teachers, and administrators. 7 Google uses benefiting
rhetoric, hands-off rhetoric, and sidelining rhetoric to

Barbara Fedders, The Constant and Expanding
Classroom: Surveillance in K-12 Public Schools, 97 N.C. L. REV.
1673, 1681-1685 (2019).
4
Barbara Kurshan, The Elephant in the Room with
EdTech Data Privacy, FORBES (June 22, 2017, 1:51 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/barbarakurshan/2017/06/22/
the-elephant-in-the-room-with-edtech-data-privacy/.
5
Marie Bienkowski, Mingyu Feng & Barbara Means,
U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Technology,
Enhancing Teaching and Learning Through Educational Data
Mining and Learning Analytics: An Issue Brief ED-04-CO-0040
(October, 2012), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED611199.pdf.
6
Shantanu Sinha, More Options for Learning with
Google Workspace for Education, EDUCATION – GOOGLE
WORKSPACE (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.blog.google/outreachinitiatives/education/google-workspace-for-education.
7
Fred Alim et al., Spying on Students: School IssuedDevices and Student Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, 1, 5 (April 13, 2017),
https://www.eff.org/files/2017/04/13/student-privacy-report.pdf.
3
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position themselves as a “non-profit org” or public
service and downplay their business model to
teachers and students. 8 In reality, Google makes
about 90 percent of its money from selling ads. 9 The
collection of student data from commercial
companies like Google poses privacy risks to students
because of the heavy concentration of data
aggregation, a lack of transparency and
communication around terms and conditions,
unclear security protocols, and insufficient policies
regarding data archiving. 10 There is growing concern
that the current laws and regulations are inadequate
and unable to keep up with the current pace of
technology, and that student privacy is undervalued
by education policymakers. 11
In 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
warned that the rapid proliferation of education
technologies in schools poses privacy and safety risks
for children due to the collection of not only
personally identifiable information (PII), web
browsing histories, IP addresses, and geolocation
data, but also biometric data, behavioral information,
disciplinary information, medical information,
Maria Lindh & Jan Nolin, Information We Collect:
Surveillance and Privacy in the Implementation of Google Apps
for Education, 15 EUR. EDUC. RES. J. 644, 650 (2016).
9
Kurshan, supra note 4.
10
Lindh & Nolin, supra note 8, at 649-654.
11
Rhoades, supra note 1; Fedders, supra note 3; Alice
Haston, Keeping it Off the Record: Student Social Media
Monitoring and the Need for Updated Student Records Laws, 22
VAN. J. ENT.& TECH. L. 155 (2019); Elana Zeide, Student Privacy
Principles for the Age of Big Data: Moving Beyond FERPA and
FIPPS, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 339 (2015); Joanna C. Zimmerle, Safe,
Sound, and Private: Promoting Data Protection for Students, 38
COMPUTERS IN THE SCHOOLS, 1 (2021).
8
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academic data, and classroom data. 12 A 2020 report
revealed that 408 cybersecurity attacks were
launched against public K-12 education agencies
during calendar year 2020, many of which involved
data breaches. 13 Malicious use of student data could
result in cyberbullying, identity theft, and social
engineering (e.g., the psychological manipulation of
divulging personal information). 14 The educational
market is the third-highest target for data hackers,
with data breaches of education records putting
student safety at risk. 15 Recent examples include
Schoolzilla, where data for over one million students
was exposed, 16 and a 2017 breach with educational
technology company Edmodo. 17 There was also a
recent incident in Brooklyn where high school
students walked out of school to protest the school’s
disclosure of student personal information to the
Summit Learning platform. 18 In another example,
Inbloom, a non-profit organization focused on
personalized learning in K-12 education, was forced
to shut down due to significant profit losses resulting

12
Crime Complaint Center, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Education Technologies: Data Collection and
Unsecured Systems Could Pose Risks to Students I-091318-PSA,
(September 13, 2018),
https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2018/PSA180913.
13
Douglas A. Levin, The State of K-12 Cybersecurity:
2020 Year in Review, EDTECH STRATEGIES, 1, 3 (March 10, 2021),
https://k12cybersecure.com/year-in-review/.
14
Id. at 3-6.
15
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 446.
16
Alexi Pfeffer-Gillett, Peeling Back the Student Privacy
Pledge, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 100, 105 (2018).
17
Meriem El-Khattabi, Note: Mining for Success: Have
Student Data Privacy and Educational Data Mining Created a
Legislative War Zone?, U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y, 511, 520
(2017).
18
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 458.
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from parent outcry over the company’s lack of
disclosure about what data they were using and why,
and the amount of student information it planned to
share with third parties. 19
Data breaches cause financial hardships for
schools and parents in the event of ransomware
attacks. 20 Schools are often unprepared to address
data protection when it is outsourced to third-party
services, and they seldom restrict companies’ use of
student data for marketing purposes. 21 Further,
many are not ready to support Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) regulations 22
related to online operator contracts. 23 Despite the
heavy use of EdTech products by school districts
across the nation, they often do not have the time or
legal expertise needed to decipher complex privacy
policy statements to ensure third-party compliance
with federal and state laws. 24 Also, the Education
Department has never actually withheld federal
funding from a school in violation of FERPA, so loss of
funding is something of an empty threat. 25 A 2013
study found most school contracts with online
operators failed to list the type of student
information collected or did not stop vendors from
selling personal student data such as names, contact
Leo Doran, Partnership Boosts Data Privacy,
EDUCATION WEEK, February 10, 2016, at 8.
20
Leo Doran, Ransomware Attacks Force School
Districts to Shore Up--Or Pay Up, EDUCATION WEEK (January 11,
2017), https://www.edweek.org/technology/ransomware-attacksforce-school-districts-to-shore-up-or-pay-up/2017/01.
21
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 456.
22
20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1974).
23
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 456.
24
Zimmerle, supra note 11, at 7.
25
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 470.
19

5
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information, or health status. 26 Furthermore, only
25% of districts informed parents of cloud services,
despite the fact that current regulations (e.g., FERPA,
Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA), and
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)) all
contain requirements related to parental notice,
consent, and access to student information. 27 School
district cloud service agreements mostly did not
cover data security, and many allowed vendors to
retain student information in perpetuity. 28 Digital
technology has the potential to leave a data trail that
can be available long after a student leaves school,
allowing private interests to mine this data for profit
and non-educational purposes. 29
Students and teachers need to understand
what rules govern their digital experience in terms of
data being collected from the systems and software
they use. Students have a tendency to share personal
information online, and are largely unconcerned
about third-party access to their data. 30 Furthermore,
they may feel pressured to waive privacy rights in
order to participate in classroom activities requiring
the use of educational technology tools. 31 The recent
COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated this
problem. In fact, The Future of Privacy Forum (FPF)
and National Education Association (NEA) recently
released new recommendations for the use of video
conferencing platforms in online learning, asking
schools and districts to reconsider mandatory video
requirements that create unique privacy and equity
Reidenberg, supra note 2, see executive summary.
Id.
28
Id.
29
Fedders, supra note 3, at 1683.
30
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 454.
31
Doran, supra note 19.
26
27
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risks for students. 32 Teachers need more professional
development training to better understand student
privacy issues; the Parent Coalition for Student
Privacy and the Badass Teachers Association found in
a national survey of teachers that 68 percent said
they had received no training in how to use education
apps in ways that protected their own and their
students' data, and a majority felt pressured to
download some apps without understanding what
data they would collect. 33 The survey report went on
to recommend teachers evaluate the data privacy
protections of EdTech services thoroughly before
adopting them. 34 This paper will explore student
privacy in relation to educational technology and
uncover the loopholes in federal and state
regulations that allow commercial companies to
mine children’s data at the expense of their privacy.
California was selected as a case study to analyze a
small sample of state regulations because of its
reputation as a role model state in student privacy. As
a leading state in creating student privacy standards,
California still allows for loopholes in its regulations.

I.

PRIVACY OF PERSONAL DATA

The general “privacy of personal data” is the “claim
that data about oneself should not be automatically
available to other individuals and organizations, and
32
Casey Waughn, Rethinking Video Mandates in Online
Classrooms: Privacy and Equity Considerations and Alternative
Engagement Methods, STUDENT PRIVACY COMPASS (December 2,
2020), https://studentprivacycompass.org/videomandates/.
33
Lauraine Genota, Data Privacy, EDUCATION WEEK
(October 31, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/technology/dataprivacy/2018/10.
34
Id.

7
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that, even where data are possessed by another party,
the individual must be able to exercise a substantial
degree of control over those data and their use.” 35
Michael Zimmer suggests there are 4 groups
of online activities that threaten to violate privacy, the
first of which is information collection (e.g.,
the recording of an individual’s activities) through data
surveillance on the internet. 36 This often comes in the
form of web cookies and tracking bugs allowing for the
tracking of student actions and engagement inside of a
web application leading to geolocation data, IP address
data, or browser data. 37 Often, this information saves to
the cloud automatically by default, without student and
parental awareness or consent. 38 Persistent identifiers
such as a user’s IP address can be used to recognize a
user over time and across vendors. 39 The second online
activity is information processing or “the way
information is stored, manipulated, and used after
collection.” 40 This can include unwanted data
aggregation of personal and sensitive data allowing
for behavioral tagging by advertisers. 41 Persuasive
behavioral advertising is dangerous and can be used for
clickbait, fake news, and predatory advertising, and can
influence user self-perception and behavior. 42 Even
though the data that advertisers collect is not personally
identifiable, the aggregation process allows for them to

Michael Zimmer, Privacy Law and Policy, THE
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIGITAL COMMUNICATION
AND SOCIETY (Feb. 11, 2015),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118767771.wbied
cs151.
36
Id. at 11-13.
37
Id.
38
Alim et al., supra note 7, at 5.
39
Zimmerle, supra note 11, at 3.
40
Zimmer, supra note 35, at 2.
41
Id. at 13-14.
42
Zimmerle, supra note 11, at 7.
35

8
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link individual pieces of information together to
particular individuals and form online profiles; this
“inferred data” creates predictive models based on
algorithms. 43 The third online activity is information
dissemination or the spreading or transfer of personal
data online, which can lead to breaches of
confidentiality, disclosure, appropriation, or
distortion. 44 Once information is disseminated online, it
is nearly impossible to remove it, so data from the past
could linger and impact students’ future scholarships,
loan applications, or medical coverage. 45 The fourth
online activity is invasion, which involves digital
intrusion such as Google’s Street View cameras,
Facebook’s tracking of online purchases, or the US
National Security Agency’s metadata of phone
records. 46 Schools are even using remote proctoring
software such as Top Hat, Kryterion, and ExamSoft to
capture students’ suspicious movements to guard
against cheating. 47 Schools are also installing safety
management platforms (SMP) such as Gaggle, Bark for
Schools, and Securly that alert them to bullying or
suicide risks. 48

Rhoades, supra note 1, at 455.
Zimmer, supra note 35, at 14-15.
45
Zimmerle, supra note 11, at 7.
46
Zimmer, supra note 35, at 15-16.
47
Lindsey Barrett, Rejecting Test Surveillance in Higher
Education, 1 Mich. St. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023).
48
Harold J. Krent, John Etchingham, Alec Kraus &
Katharine Pancewicz, AI Goes to School—Implications for School
District Liability, 67 BUFF. L. REV.1329, 1331 (2019).
43
44

9
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REVIEW OF STUDENT PRIVACY REGULATIONS

A. Historical Overview of Key Regulations
Most other industrialized countries support more
comprehensive privacy and data protection measures
than the United States does. 49 This section gives a
historical overview of the key federal and California
regulations impacting student privacy in the digital age.
For the complete list, see Table 1 and Table 2. Also, for
the list of key Supreme Court Cases, see Table 3.
Table 1: Federal Regulations Related to Student
Privacy
Law/Act/
Regulation
Family
Educational
Rights and
Privacy Act of
1974
(FERPA)

49

Year
Took
Effect
1974

Key Points

Loophole/Weakne
ss

Protects students
and their families
by ensuring the
privacy of student
educational
records;
educational records
are agency or
institutionmaintained records
containing
personally
identifiable student
and educational
data

Overly broad
definition of
“educational
record;” 2011
amendments
permitted schools to
disclose data to
third parties (as
authorized
educational
partners) that
exceeds the
traditional school
records FERPA was
designed to protect;
no penalty for
commercial

Zimmer, supra note 35, at 4.

10
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Protection of
Pupil Rights
Amendment
(PPRA)

1978

Communicati
ons Decency
Act of 1996

1996

Children’s
Online
Privacy
Protection Act
(COPPA)

2000

Children’s
Internet
Protection Act
(CIPA)

2000,
update
d in
2011

Applies to
programs that get
their funding from
the United States
Department of
Education and
protects students
from having to
reveal personal
information in
certain surveys
without parental
consent
Title V of the
Telecommunicatio
ns Act of 1996 is an
attempt to prevent
minors from
gaining access to
sexually explicit
materials on the
Internet
Governs the online
collection of
personal
information from
children under the
age of 13; parental
consent is required

K-12 schools and
libraries filter
minors’ internet
access and monitor
their online
activities to protect

companies violating
FERPA
Parental consent
requirement only
applies when the
surveys request
certain information,
such as political
affiliations, mental
and psychological
disorders, and
sexual attitudes

Section 230
protects online
platforms from
legal liability for
any content created
by their users

FTC issued
exception for data
disclosed by
schools to online
operators acting as
authorized
educational
partners- puts the
burden for this back
on FERPA
By relying on
filtering software,
schools delegate
some decisions to
private companies
about what is

11
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European
Union
General Data
Protection
Regulation of
2018 (GDPR)

2018

them from harmful
online content like
pornography
Replaces the Data
Protection
Directive 95/46/EC
and was designed
to harmonize data
privacy laws across
Europe, to protect
and empower all
EU citizens’ data
privacy, and to
reshape the way
organizations
across the region
approach data
privacy; stricter
controls on privacy
than any U.S. laws
- includes special
protections for
children, such as
requiring parental
consent prior to
processing
childrens’ data 51

[2021

appropriate 50
N/A

50 Martha M. McCarthy, Suzanne E. Eckes & Janet R.
Decker, Legal Rights of School Leaders, Teachers, and Students
89 (8th ed. 2019).
51
Laura Hautala, CCPA is Here: California’s Privacy
Law Gives You New Rights, CNET (January 3, 2020),
https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/ccpa-is-herecalifornias-privacy-law-gives-you-new-rights/.
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B. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA)
The first law protecting student privacy was the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA) 52 to regulate schools’ practices of releasing
student information and to mandate more parental
oversight and transparency. 53 Educational records were
defined as information directly related to a student and
maintained by an educational agency or institution or
by a person acting for such agency or institution. 54
FERPA was introduced by Senator James Buckley and
signed into law by President Ford, but Congress has
amended FERPA nine times since its enactment due to
changing technologies. 55 This law is considered the
birth of federal privacy rights for students, and FERPA
is still the most widely used federal education law
protecting student privacy in the United States. 56
However, the statute is not sufficiently protective of
student information given today’s technological
advances, as it is unclear whether students’ personally
identifiable information (PII) via school surveillance
technologies is considered part of the educational
record. 57 In 2011, the Education Department issued
amendments to FERPA defining “authorized
representative” to include non-governmental actors as
representatives of schools, widening the scope of who
Supra note 22.
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 449.
54
Supra note 22, at section 4A.
55
Katelyn Ringrose, Data Collection in Schools: Privacy
Implications for K-12 Students Under a Weakened FERPA, 16
DARTMOUTH L. J., 130, 132 (2018).
56
Amelia Vance and Casey Waughn, Student Privacy's
History of Unintended Consequences, 44 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.,
515, 519 (2020).
57
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 477.
52
53

13
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could access student records. 58 FERPA’s overly broad
definition of “educational record,” along with the 2011
amendment that permits schools to disclose data to third
parties as educational partners (in essence
characterizing EdTech companies as the same as
“school officials”), creates a loophole for the EdTech
industry. 59
PII can be disclosed from education records
without student or parental consent into integrated data
systems that link data from multiple government
agencies under two exceptions: the audit and evaluation
exception of federal or state education programs, and
the school official exception. 60 Under the “school
official” exception created in 2008, schools may now
disclose education records to a service provider without
consent from the parent or eligible student if the service
provider performs a service that would otherwise use
school employees, is under the “direct control” of the
institution for using and maintaining education records,
and is contractually prohibited from using education
records other than as specified. 61 Gonzaga University v.
Doe (2002) 62 established that there is no private right to
sue, so students are not able to file private claims of
action for FERPA violations, but they may file a
Ringrose, supra note 55, at 136.
Fedders, supra note 3, 1683–84.
60
PRIVACY TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., INTEGRATED DATA SYSTEMS AND STUDENT PRIVACY 7
(2017),
https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/sites/default/files/resource_document
/file/IDS-Final_0.pdf.
61
Bart W. Huffman et al., Protecting Student Data:
Student Privacy Requirements and Guidelines for Post-Secondary
Institutions, REED SMITH (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2017/10/protectingstudent-data-student-privacy-requirements-and-guidelines
62
536 U.S. 273 (2002).
58
59

14
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complaint with the Education Department. 63 Students
can also sue under a relevant state law, but not all states
have such laws. 64 In 2014, the Education Department
released guidance on how to interpret and apply
FERPA in the digital age. 65 One example from the new
guidelines indicates that a provider may not use data
about individual student preferences gleaned from
scanning student content to target ads because this does
not constitute a legitimate educational interest. 66
However, the EdTech companies are able to collect and
store information that goes beyond the traditional
“school records” that FERPA was designed to protect,
including indirect and inferred data, without requiring
parental consent before disclosure. 67 The ability of
online applications to collect student engagement data
unrelated to a student’s education exceeds what FERPA
was designed to protect and is not considered “directory
information.” 68 There are no repercussions or financial
penalties for EdTech companies who violate FERPA,
since penalties are limited to the withholding of federal
funding to schools or educational institutions.69
In Owasso Independent School District v. Falvo
(2002) 70, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that peer
grading does not qualify as educational records under
FERPA because they were not "maintained," as the
student graders only handled the items for a few
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 451–52.
Ringrose, supra note 55, at 142.
65
Department Releases New Guidance on Protecting
Student Privacy While Using Online Educational Services, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/department-releases-new-guidance-protecting-studentprivacy-while-using-online-e
66
Id.
67
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 455.
68
Id. at 459.
69
Id. at 467.
70
534 U.S. 426 (2002).
63
64

15
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moments and schools must demonstrate a more
permanent intent to retain the file. 71 This has
implications for the type of student data being collected
by third parties that is not directly related to student
education because it lacks the intent of permanency and
can be considered temporary (and thus outside of
FERPA regulation). 72 Also, the finding that peer grades
are not education records because school officials did
not capture the data or create it with the intent of
retaining it in a permanent file is important. Cloud
servers offer unlimited storage, and data generated and
shared between users instead of with schools (e.g.,
emails or chat) evades FERPA requirements because it
did not originate inside of an educational context. 73
Similarly, in S.A. v. Tulare County Office of Education
(2009) 74, the ruling was that school emails stored on
individual teachers’ hard drives were not education
records because they were not centrally located. Since
those emails had not been printed and placed in the
student’s file, the court held there was no FERPA
violation. 75
C. Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA)

Daniel R. Dinger, Johnny Saw My Test Score, So I'm
Suing My Teacher: Falvo v. Owasso Independent School District,
Peer Grading, and a Student's Right to Privacy under the Family
Education Rights and Privacy Act, 30 J.L & EDUC. 575, 616,
(2001).
72
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 464.
73
Id. at 464-465.
74
S.A. v. Tulare County Office of Education, No. CV F
08-1215, 2009 WL 30298 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 24, 2009)
75
Julie Underwood, Under the Law: You Say ‘Records,’
and I Say ‘Data’, 98 PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 74, 74 (2017).
71
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The Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment
(PPRA), 76 which was passed in 1978 and amended in
2002 as part of the No Child Left Behind Act, regulates
student participation in surveys or evaluations that
reveal specific types of information. 77 It restricts a
school's ability to disclose, use, or sell student
information that falls under the statute for marketing
purposes without first notifying the student's parents
and presenting them with the opportunity to opt-out. 78
It applies to educational agencies that receive federal
funding, and it does not contain a private right of
action. 79 Exceptions to PPRA apply when "the
collection, disclosure, or use of personal information
collected from students [is] for the exclusive purpose of
developing, evaluating, or providing educational
products or services for, or to, students or educational
institutions.”80 The main distinction between PPRA and
FERPA is that PPRA is involved only when a school
collects certain types of personal information from a
student, while FERPA protects a student's education
records from disclosure. 81 PPRA was created to work in
tandem with FERPA to provide parents and students
additional protection. 82 The parental consent
requirement, however, applies only when the surveys
Pub. L. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2143 (1978) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C § 1232h).
77
Emily Gold Waldman, Show and Tell?: Students’
Personal Lives, Schools, and Parents, 47 CONN. L. REV. 699, 704–
705 (2015).
78
Dylan Peterson, EdTech and Student Privacy:
California Law as a Model, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 961, 983
(2016).
79
Id.
80
20 U.S.C. § 1232h(c)(2)(C)(i).
81
Peterson, supra note 78, at 983.
82
Loree Varella, When it Rains, it Pours: Protecting
Student Data Stored in the Cloud, 42 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH.
L.J. 94, 103 (2016).
76
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request certain information, such as political
affiliations, sexual attitudes, family problems, and other
personal matters. 83 Many schools use student
information in undefined and unknown ways, which
would therefore fall outside the PPRA parental consent
regulation. 84 Due to the restricted subjects and the
requirement that the material be obtained with Board of
Education funding, PPRA's, and by extension,
FERPA's, application to student information processed
through cloud computing is limited.85
D. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)

In 2000, Congress enacted the Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) 86 to regulate online
operators’ collection and use of children’s personally
identifiable information (PII) in response to FTC
findings that most websites marketed to children
collected personal information and did not post an
adequate privacy policy. 87 COPPA required websites to
provide notice and receive parental consent prior to
collection from children under the age of thirteen. 88 The
enforcement agency is the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), who amended COPPA regulations in 2012 to
include persistent identifiers such as cookies or
fingerprints, IP address and geolocation, and media
Waldman, supra note 77, at 704–705.
Varella, supra note 82, at 103.
85
Id.
86
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub.
L. no. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
6505).
87
Tianna Gadbaw, Legislative Update: Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 36 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 228, 228
(2016)
88
Id.
83
84
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files such as photos and video recordings. 89 The statute
requires operators of children's websites to post privacy
policies outlining what information is collected from
children by the operator, how the operator uses the
information, and the operator's disclosure practices. 90
However, the FTC excludes schools from COPPA
enforcement, claiming that FERPA regulates school
data disclosure. 91 This acts as a loophole if companies
contract directly with schools, and allows commercial
companies to operate without FTC oversight. 92 An
analysis of free children’s mobile apps’ compliance
with COPPA in 2018 revealed that the majority violated
COPPA, due to their use of third-party software
development kits (SDK) that transmitted sensitive
data. 93
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
announced changes to update its COPPA Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQs) to include companies
contracting with schools: they must not state in their
“Terms of Service or anywhere else” that schools are
responsible for complying with COPPA because it is
the responsibility of the Operator. 94 Also, the FTC
provided more detailed descriptions of operators’ and
schools’ obligations under the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and the Protection

Rhoades, supra note 1, at 452–453.
Fedders, supra note 3, at 1684.
91
Id.
92
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 471.
93
Primal Wijesekera et al., Won’t Somebody Think of the
Children?” Examining COPPA Compliance at Scale, 3 PROC.
PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 63 (2018).
94
The Federal Trade Commission Updates to the COPPA
FAQ, FUTURE OF PRIV. F. (Oct. 21, 2020), https://fpf.org/blog/ftcupdates-coppa-faqs/.
89
90
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of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA). 95 Still, since there
is no automated system in place to formally track
vendors whose privacy policies are not in compliance
with COPPA, the FTC largely fails to act fast enough to
catch noncompliant vendors who sell student data. 96
E. California Regulations
All fifty states have separate and different student
privacy protection laws, so a thorough review of state
regulations is outside the scope of this paper. California
has “long been considered a leader in privacy law,” 97
but despite being recognized as a leader in setting K-12
school privacy standards, even California is not doing
enough to protect student privacy. California was
selected as a case study to analyze a small sample of
state regulations because of its reputation as a role
model state in student privacy. For a summary of the
key California regulations, see Table 2. In 2015, the
Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital
World (2015) 98 was enacted, which restricts certain
types of marketing to CA minors and allows those who
are registered users of an operator’s site or service to
request removal of personal content posted to a website,
social media profile, or online service while under the
age of eighteen. 99 In 2016, the Student Online Personal

95

Id.
Zimmerle, supra note 11, at 4.
97
Peterson, supra note 78, at 972.
98
S.B. 568, 2013 Leg. (Cal. 2013).
99
New California Privacy Law for Minors Has Taken
Effect as of January 1, 2015, COOLEY LLP (Jan. 5, 2015),
https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2015/new-californiaprivacy-law-for-minors-has-taken-effect-as-of-january-1-2015
96
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Information Protection Act (SOPIPA) took effect. 100
This California law prohibits operators such as
educational websites, online services, and mobile
applications from sharing student data for targeted
advertising for non-educational purposes.101 It also
prohibits online service providers from creating K-12
student profiles for commercial purposes and forbids
companies from selling student information.102 Under
SOPIPA, K-12 mobile and online service operators
must establish security measures and delete student
information at the request of a school or district.103
The law does permit K-12 mobile and online service
operators to use deidentified student information to
improve educational products.104 SOPIPA is silent as
to the standard that operators will be held to in terms of
the level of personal data deidentification it requires, so
one concern is that SOPIPA allows companies too
much latitude in their use of deidentified data.105
Unfortunately, general audience websites like Google
are not bound by the law, since they don’t target K-12
students specifically.106
California was the first state to ban operators of
education websites and online services from targeted
advertising to students, but this term was never clearly
S.B.1177, 2014 Leg. (Cal. 2014).
California's Student Online Personal Information
Protection Act is the First State Law to Comprehensively Address
Student Privacy, COOLEY LLP (October 9, 2014),
https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2014/californias-studentonline-personal-information-protection-act-is-the-first-state-lawto-comprehensively-address-student-privacy.
102
Jordan Clark, What is SOPIPA?, EDLINK (April 1,
2020), https://ed.link/community/what-is-sopipa/.
103
Id.
104
COOLEY LLP, supra note 101.
105
Peterson, supra note 78, at 991–992.
106
Id. at 964–965, 964 n.18.
100
101
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defined, leaving both companies and students confused
about what was not allowed.107 Marco Crocetti argues
that SOPIPA's advertising prohibitions raise serious
First Amendment concerns because it is overly broad
and more restrictive than necessary to advance
California's alleged governmental objectives.108 It
closes off a potentially large revenue source that could
be used towards improving education, and is an
unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech.
Suggested alternatives are consent exceptions, industry
self-regulatory regimes (e.g., Student Privacy Pledge),
and advertising filtering regimes. 109
In 2020, the California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA) 110 took effect to regulate data privacy in
California. It was modeled after the European Union
General Data Protection Regulation of 2018
(GDPR), 111 but is a more restrictive version. 112 The
GDPR protects the privacy of European Union (EU)
residents’ data, including that of American students
who are living in the EU. However, EU students who

107
RACHAEL STRICKLAND & LEONIE HAIMSON, THE
STATE STUDENT PRIVACY REPORT CARD: GRADING THE STATES
ON PROTECTING STUDENT DATA PRIVACY 9 (Jan. 2019),
https://www.studentprivacymatters.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/The-2019-State-Student-Privacy-ReportCard.pdf.
108
Marco Crocetti, Targeted Advertising and the First
Amendment: Student Privacy vs. Protected Speech, 25 CATHOLIC
UNIV. J.L. & TECH. 23, 39 (2016).
109
Id.at 50.
110
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ.
Code §§ 1798.100–1798.192 (2018).
111
2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. [hereinafter GDPR].
112
Noah Ramirez, Comparing CCPA and GDPR: 8 Key
Differences Between the Privacy Laws, OSANO (Sep. 29, 2020),
https://www.osano.com/articles/gdpr-vs-ccpa
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move to the US to attend school are not protected. 113
The GDPR contains several rights that go beyond any
current laws in the United States, such as the right of
data subjects to have their data erased, the right of data
subjects to receive their personal data in a commonly
used format and have it transmitted to another data
controller, and the right not to be subject to an adverse
decision based solely on the application of artificial
intelligence. 114 Also, it requires companies to receive
consent to collect data or to have some other valid
reason for collecting user information, and it requires
companies to minimize the data collected. 115 The CCPA
broadly defines personal information to include
biometric data, geolocation, household purchase data,
and sleep habits. 116 The CCPA offers the following
privacy rights: (1) “to know what personal information
is being collected about them;” (2) “to know whether
their personal information is sold or disclosed and to
whom;” (3) “the right…to say no to the sale of personal
information;” (4) “to access their personal
information;” and 5) “to equal service and price, even if
they exercise their privacy rights.” 117 CCPA expands
requirements on companies collecting PII from children
under 13 to also include 13- to 16-year-olds, but it only
applies to the sale of (not the sharing of) data, which
allows companies to still track user behavior and link it
to other accounts without technically “selling” the
113

Does GDPR Apply to EU Citizens Living in the US?,
HIPPA JOURNAL (May 11, 2018),
https://www.hipaajournal.com/does-gdpr-apply-to-eu-citizensliving-in-the-us/.
114
Mark A. Rothstein and Stacey A. Tovino, California
Takes the Lead on Data Privacy Law, 49 HASTINGS CTR. REP., 4, 5
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/hast.1042.
115
Hautala, supra note 51.
116
Rothstein, supra note 114, at 4.
117
CCPA § 1798.100.
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data. 118 Also, data can still be sold if PII is removed,
and there are no provisions to address if a parent or
student asks a company to delete PII that schools are
required to collect and maintain for federal/state
reporting. 119

Table 2: California Regulations Related to Student
Privacy
Law/Act/
Regulation

Year
Key Points
Took
Effect
2015 Restricts certain
Privacy
types of
Rights for
marketing to
California
minors. It also
allows minors who
Minors in
the Digital
are registered users
of
World
an operator's site or
service to request
removal of personal
content
Student
2016 CA act that
Online
prohibits operators
Personal
(e.g., educational
Information
websites, online
Protection
services, online
Act
applications, and
(SOPIPA)
mobile applications)
from sharing
student data and
using that data for
targeted advertising
to students for a

Loophole/Weakness
N/A

Google Search (and
other general
audience
websites/services)
not bound by this
law, since it doesn’t
target K-12 students;
the term “targeted
advertising” was
never clearly defined

Micah Castelo, How the CCPA Affects California
School Districts. EDTECH: FOCUS ON K-12 (July 15, 2020), .
119
Id.
118
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California
Consumer
Privacy Act
of 2018
(CCPA)

I.

2020

non-educational
purpose
Leading state statute
for an express
private right of
action for data
breaches resulting
from a failure to
implement
reasonable data
security measures;
does not regulate
non-profits. Broadly
defines personal
info to include
biometric data,
geolocation,
household purchase
data, sleep habits.
Consumers can
request the info
collected, to delete
personal info, or to
opt out of the sale
of their personal
info

Extends
requirements on
companies collecting
PII from children
under 13 to include
13- to 16-year-olds,
but only applies to
the sale of data (not
the sharing of),
doesn’t include
deidentified data,
and doesn’t make
provision to address
if a parent or student
asks a company to
delete PII that
schools are required
to collect and
maintain for
federal/state
reporting 120

OVERVIEW OF KEY CASES

A. Supreme Court Cases
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet explicitly
addressed a school's ability to regulate student internet
activity in the context of big data and educational data
mining. 121 With technology changing how and where
information is stored and accessed by schools, this
120
121

Id.
Haston, supra note 11, at 161.
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needs to be addressed. A few constitutional
amendments have been influential in interpreting
privacy cases. The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures of their private effects, papers,
homes, and bodies; and it has been extended somewhat
to students through case law. 122 The “due process”
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution indicates no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. 123 And, the First Amendment promises free
speech, including the allowance of online platforms to
curate their own content. Just as the First Amendment
protects newspaper editors who cannot be compelled to
publish a particular content item, the same concept
applies to search engines, which cannot be compelled to
include certain links. i This section gives a historical
overview of the key Supreme Court cases directly or
indirectly related to student privacy in the digital age,
all with some implications for privacy rights or how
student information is collected, processed, or
disseminated via cloud computing. For the complete
list, see Table 3.
Table 3: Key Supreme Court Cases Related to
Student Privacy
Case
Katz v. United States

Year
1967

Key Points

4th Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches
and seizures requires police to
obtain a search warrant in order
to wiretap a public pay phone

Joanna Tudor, Legal Implications of Using Digital
Technology in Public Schools: Effects on Privacy, 44 J.L. & EDUC.
287, 335 (2015).
123
McCarthy, supra note 50, at 9.
122
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Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community
School District

1969

Doe v. McMillan

1973

Whalen v. Roe

1977

New Jersey v. T.L.O.

1985

Reno v. ACLU

1997

Owasso
Independent School
District v. Falvo

2002

Students do not lose their 1st
Amendment rights to freedom
of speech when they step onto
school property
Invasion of privacy case against
D.C. school system for the
dissemination of a
congressional report that
included identification of
students in derogatory contexts
(e.g., copies of test papers,
disciplinary reports, and
evaluations with the students'
names still on them)
Ruled that the reporting and
record-keeping requirements of
the New York State Controlled
Substances Act did not violate a
constitutionally protected 'zone
of privacy’ through collecting
patient’s name, address, and
age - but recognized the
constitutional right to
information privacy
The search of T.L.O.’s purse
for cigarettes was a reasonable
warrantless search
Certain provisions of the 1996
Communications Decency Act
(intended to protect minors
from unsuitable internet
material) violate the First and
Fifth Amendments
The practice of peer grading
does not violate FERPA
because they were not
maintained and student graders
were not acting for an
educational institution within
FERPA
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Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe

2002

United States v.
American Library
Association

2003

Safford Unified School
District v. Redding

2009

Riley v. California

2014

[2021

Individuals and organizations
cannot sue to enforce FERPA
American Library Association
unsuccessfully challenged the
Children's Internet Protection
Act, claiming that requiring
public libraries to install
internet filtering software on
their computers in order to
qualify for federal funding
restricted the first Amendment
rights of their patrons
Strip search of 8th grader ruled
as a violation of her 4th
Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and
seizures
Cell phone discovered through
a search was found to violate
4th Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and
seizures

One early case related to information collection
practices is Katz v. United States (1967), 124 which made
government wiretapping of communication subject to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements. In
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District (1969), ii the Supreme Court ruled that a
prohibition against the wearing of armbands to protest
the Vietnam War in public school violated students’
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when
they step onto school property. This is important
because, later, the Supreme Court extended these rights
to include Fourth Amendment protections. 125 In Doe v.
124
125

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Tudor, supra note 122, at 332.
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McMillan (1973), 126 parents of District of Columbia
(D.C.) school children were seeking damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief for invasion of privacy
that they claimed resulted from the dissemination of a
congressional report, on the D.C. school system, that
included identification of students in derogatory
contexts. The information included copies of test
papers, disciplinary reports, and evaluations with the
students' names still on them; and it had Fourteenth
Amendment implications because it set limits on the
immunity of civil government officials. 127 In Whalen v.
Roe (1977), 128 the Supreme Court ruled that the
reporting and record-keeping requirements of the New
York State Controlled Substances Act did not violate a
constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” through
collecting patient’s name, address, and age; but
recognized the constitutional right to information
privacy. In New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), 129 a student
was charged with drug offenses based on items she had
in her purse. The search of her purse for cigarettes was
instigated because she was caught smoking in the
bathroom, and it was ruled a reasonable warrantless
search that did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The
case is important because it implied that Fourth
Amendment protections still apply to students but are
limited in scope. 130
In Reno v. ACLU (1997), 131 the Supreme Court
ruled that certain provisions of the 1996
Communications Decency Act 132 (intended to protect
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
Vance, supra note 56, at 517–520.
128
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
129
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
130
Tudor, supra note 122, at 336.
131
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
132
Communications Decency Act of 2016, 47 U.S.C.§
230 (1996).
126
127
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minors from unsuitable internet material) violate the
First and Fifth Amendments by being overly broad and
vague in their definitions of the types of internet
communications which they criminalized. In Owasso
Independent School District v. Falvo (2002), 133 as
discussed previously, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
peer grading does not qualify as educational records
under FERPA because they were not "maintained," as
the student graders only handled the items for a few
moments and schools must demonstrate a more
permanent intent to retain the file. 134 In Gonzaga
University v. Doe (2002), 135 the Supreme Court ruled
that individuals and organizations cannot sue to enforce
FERPA. A student attempted to sue a private university
for damages to enforce provisions of FERPA, but
FERPA’s confidentiality provisions did not have the
clear and unambiguous terms that the creation of
individual rights required. The decision effectively
closed the courts to the students, parents, and
newspapers harmed by FERPA errors. The result is that
schools may question why they should comply with
FERPA if there is no enforcement. 136 In United States
v. American Library Association (2003), 137 the
American Library Association unsuccessfully
challenged the Children's Internet Protection Act, 138
claiming that requiring public libraries to install internet
filtering software on their computers in order to qualify
for federal funding restricted the First Amendment
133

426 (2002).

Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S.

Dinger, supra note 71, at 581–582.
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
136
Zach Greenberg, Let FERPA be FERPA, 64 CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC., (Jan. 14, 2018).
137
United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
138
Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA), 20 U.S.C. §
9134(f) (2018).
134
135
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rights of their patrons. In Safford Unified School
District v. Redding (2009), 139 an eighth grader was
strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip
by another student that she might have ibuprofen on her
person in violation of school policy. This was ruled as a
violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures. This case is
important because it “extends a reasonable expectation
of privacy to students regarding their personal
belongings.” 140 In Riley v. California (2014), 141 the
evidence admitted at trial from a gang member’s cell
phone, discovered through a search, was found to
violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches. This decision “stands for the
conclusion that the information on a cell phone is
entitled to more protection than other common items
found in someone’s pocket or purse.” 142
B. Other Cases
Several more recent cases continue to shed light on the
current state of online student privacy protection (see
Table 4 for the full list). In S.A. v. Tulare County Office
of Education (2009), 143 it was ruled that emails stored
on individual teachers’ hard drives are not education
records until the document is centrally located. This
implies that data collected online that is not maintained
by the school is not covered under FERPA. 144 In 2014,
a consolidated, multi-district litigation involving seven
139

364 (2009).

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S.

Tudor, supra note 122, at 136.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
142
Tudor, supra note 122, at 335.
143
S.A. v. Tulare Cnty. Off. of Educ., NO. CV F 08-1215
LJO GSA, 2009 WL 30298 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2009).
144
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 453.
140
141
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individual class lawsuits against Google, Inc. was
combined into the case In re Google, Inc. Gmail
Litig.145 The plaintiffs challenged Google's operation of
Gmail under state and federal anti-wiretapping laws,
and argued for a COPPA violation. Among the
plaintiffs were two students who were required to use
Gmail accounts through their institution’s adoption of
Google Apps for Education (GAFE). Google admitted
to scanning email messages from student users of
GAFE and treating them like regular Gmail consumers.
The plaintiffs alleged they used the information to build
user profiles for targeted advertising in not just GAFE
but other Google products like Google Search and
YouTube. 146 Some emails could contain sensitive
information, such as a child’s disability status or mental
health, which may now be forever associated with
them. 147 In 2014, Electronic Privacy Information
Center v. United States Department of Education 148
involved a complaint filed with the FTC that Google
was using information collected from GAFE users who
go outside GAFE to use other Google services within
the Chrome browser, in ways that violate the Student
Privacy Pledge Google had signed. 149 The Pledge only
covers information collected within an educational
service. 150 The suit prompted U.S. MN Senator Al
In re Google, Inc. Gmail Litig., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1381,
(J.P.M.L. 2013).
146
Benjamin Herold, Google Under Fire for Data
Analysis of Student Emails, 33 EDUC. WEEK, (Mar. 26, 2014).
147
Id.
148
Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 48
F.Supp.3d 1 (D.C.C. 2014).
149
Benjamin Herold, Google Acknowledges Data Mining
Student Users Outside Apps for Education, 35 EDUC. WEEK, 12,
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.edweek.org/technology/googleacknowledges-data-mining-student-users-outside-apps-foreducation/2016/02.
150
Id.
145
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Franken to write a letter asking for more details on the
privacy settings and uses for data within the GAFE
suite of tools and what PII was being collected on
individual students. iii Google responded that it collects
names, email addresses, telephone numbers, device
information, and IP addresses. 151 Even though it has
agreed to not use personal information from GAFE
users to target ads, anything subsequently used outside
of GAFE is not protected. 152
Table 4: Other Recent Court Cases Related to Student
Privacy in the Digital Age
Case
S.A. v. Tulare
County Office
of Education

Year
2009

In re Google
Inc. Gmail
Litig

2013

Electronic
Privacy
Information
Center v.
United States
Department
of Education

2014

Google Inc. v.
Hood

2016

151
152

Key Points
Emails stored on individual
teachers’ hard drives are not
education records until the
document is centrally located;
implies that data collected online
that is not maintained by the
school is not covered under
FERPA
Google admitted to scanning email
messages from student users of
GAFE and treating them like
regular Gmail consumers
Google was using information
collected from GAFE users who go
outside GAFE to use other Google
services within the Chrome
browser in ways that violate the
Student Privacy Pledge Google had
signed
Google’s policies and practices for
online tracking of student data

Herold, supra note 151.
Id.
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was unclear; Google tracks and
stores student data for advertising
purposes when students use
outside services
Musical.ly (now TikTok) app
illegally
collected
personal
information about children under
13, such as email addresses,
names, and schools without
parental consent in violation of
COPPA
Google settled with the Federal
Trade Commission and New
York’s attorney general, for
violating COPPA, to pay $170
million and make changes to its
YouTube procedures for childdirected content
Pearson neglected to implement
security measures that would
have thwarted hackers who
slipped past Pearson's defenses
and gained access to the data
hosted on AIMSweb
Google has used GSFE to spy on
New Mexico students’ online
activities for its own commercial
purposes, without notice to
parents and without attempting to
obtain parental consent (COPPA
violation)

In Google, Inc. v. Hood (2016), 153 the Mississippi
Attorney General James M. Hood, III, filed a lawsuit
claiming Google’s policies and practices for online
153

Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2016).
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tracking of student data was unclear. 154 Furthermore,
Google tracks and stores student data for advertising
purposes when students use outside services like
Google Maps or YouTube, despite Google’s contract
stating otherwise. 155 Google alleged that Hood's
investigation violates Google's immunity under the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 156 its Fourth
Amendment rights, and the First Amendment rights of
Google and its users. 157 In FTC v. Musical.ly (2019),
the FTC reached a $5.76 million settlement with
Musical.ly, a popular video social network now known
as TikTok, over accusations that the company’s app
illegally collected personal information about children
under 13, such as email addresses, names, and schools,
without parental consent, in violation of COPPA.158
When asked by some parents to delete videos and other
data, the site refused. 159 Specifically, TikTok violated
COPPA by “failing to post a privacy policy on its
online service providing clear, understandable, and
complete notice of its information practices; failing to
provide direct notice of its information practices to
parents; failing to obtain verifiable parental consent
prior to collecting, using, and/or disclosing personal
information from children; failing to delete personal
information at the request of parents; and retaining
personal information longer than reasonably necessary
Benjamin Herold, Miss. AG Sues Google Inc. Over
Student-Data Privacy. 36 EDUC. WEEK, 4 (Jan. 25, 2017).
155
Hood, 822 F.3d 212.
156
47 U.S.C.§ 230.
157
Hood, 822 F.3d 212.
158
Video Social Networking App Musical.ly Agrees to
Settle FTC Allegations That It Violated Children's Privacy Law,
FED. TRADE COMM'N (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2019/02/video-social-networking-appmusically-agrees-settle-ftc.
159
Id.
154
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to fulfill the purpose for which the information was
collected.” 160 TikTok user accounts were previously
public by default, and adults were able to contact users
regardless of their age. iv The FTC alleged that TikTok
had “actual knowledge” they were collecting personal
information from kids. 161
Also in 2019, in the case FTC and State of New
York vs. Google LLC and YouTube, LLC, Google
settled with the Federal Trade Commission and New
York’s attorney general, for violating COPPA, to pay
$170 million and make changes to its YouTube
procedures for child-directed content. 162 The YouTube
video sharing service, owned by Google, illegally
collected personal information from children without
their parents’ consent. 163 COPPA imposes obligations
on online services that have actual knowledge that they
are collecting, using, or disclosing personal information
from children under 13, 164 and the case determined that
YouTube did have this “actual knowledge.” If a childdirected content provider directly communicates the
child-directed nature of its content to the third-party
operator, or a representative of the third-party
operator’s ad network recognizes the child-directed
nature of the content, this is considered having actual
Lesley Fair, Largest FTC COPPA Settlement Requires
Musical.ly to Change its Tune, FED. TRADE COMM’N, at para 8
(Feb. 27, 2019, 12:57 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2019/02/largest-ftc-coppa-settlementrequires-musically-change-its.
161
Fair, supra note 163.
162
Google and YouTube Will Pay Record $170 Million
for Alleged Violations of Children's Privacy Law, FED. TRADE
COMM'N (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2019/09/google-youtube-will-pay-record-170-millionalleged-violations.
163
Id.
164
Zimmerle, supra note 11, at 3.
160
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knowledge. 165 YouTube met both criteria, since it
actively marketed itself as a top destination for kids. 166
The case classified YouTube as collecting personal
information from children on behalf of individual
creators, and placed new requirements on YouTube and
content creators to self-identify their child-directed
content on the YouTube platform. 167 YouTube also had
to notify channel owners that their child-directed
content may be subject to the COPPA obligations, and
provide annual training about complying with COPPA
for employees. 168 The case is significant because it did
not allow YouTube to slide under COPPA’s “internal
operations” exception, which permits operators to
collect persistent identifiers from children without
parental consent if the identifiers are only used for
internal operations. 169
In 2020, a group of Illinois and Colorado parents
initiated the case Kylie S. v. Pearson PLC, 475 F. Supp.
3d 841 (2020). 170 They alleged that Pearson neglected
to implement security measures that would have
thwarted hackers from gaining access to the data hosted

165
See also Natasha Singer & Kate Conger, Google is
Fined $170 Million for Violating Children’s Privacy on YouTube,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/technology/google-youtubefine-ftc.html (describing the settlement between YouTube and the
FTC).
166
See id.
167
See id.
168
Id.
169
Sara Collins, FTC Reaches Landmark Settlement
Regarding Kids’ Privacy, Clarifies Platforms’ and Video Creators’
COPPA Obligations for Child-Directed Content, FUTURE OF PRIV.
F. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://fpf.org/blog/ftc-reaches-landmarksettlement-regarding-kids-privacy-clarifies-platforms-and-videocreators-coppa-obligations-for-child-directed-content/.
170
Kylie S. v. Pearson PLC, 475 F. Supp. 3d 841 (2020).

37

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byu_elj/vol2021/iss1/6

38

Archambault: Student Privacy in the Digital Age

BYU Education & Law Journal

[2021

on AIMSweb, in violation of FERPA. 171 Pearson is an
educational testing platform that stores students' names,
emails, and birthdays, among other information. 172 In
New Mexico ex rel. Balderas v. Google, LLC, 489 F.
Supp. 3d 1254 (D.N.M. 2020), 173 the state of New
Mexico alleged that Google had used its G Suite for
Education (GSFE) to spy on New Mexico students'
online activities for its own commercial purposes,
without notice to parents and without attempting to
obtain parental consent. 174 This is a violation of
COPPA, since Google failed to provide direct notice to,
and obtain verifiable consent directly from, parents
before collecting students’ personal data from schoolissued email accounts. 175 Specifically, Google was
accused of tracking students’ physical locations, webbrowsing histories, and personal contact lists. 176 Google
used, as its defense, FTC guidelines stating that schools
can act as intermediaries between companies and
parents to obtain parental consent. 177 The ruling was in
favor of Google, saying that Google could rely on
individual schools to obtain the required parental

171

Id.
Id.
173
New Mexico ex rel. Balderas v. Google, LLC, 489 F.
Supp. 3d 1254 (D.N.M. 2020).
174
Id.
175
Dave Embree, Google escapes New Mexico AG’s
student privacy suit, WESTLAW DATA PRIV. DAILY BRIEFING (Oct.
16, 2020)
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I5189ebee073011ebbea4f0d
c9fb69570/View/FullText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&transiti
onType=Default&firstPage=true&OWSessionId=d45017fb063847
3c9f85d7252bff7fe3&fromAnonymous=true&bhcp=1&CobaltRefr
esh=84834.
176
Id.
177
Id.
172
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consent for data collection activities, rather than
contacting parents directly. 178

II.

IMPLICATIONS

A. Implications for Policymakers
There are many loopholes in existing federal
and state regulations that allow commercial companies
to mine children’s data at the expense of their privacy,
as discussed throughout this paper (see Tables 1 and 2).
Policymakers need to work to make sure future
legislation has clearer and more explicit language, and
that it contains fewer loopholes to hold third party
commercial companies to greater legal
accountability. FERPA guidelines can be amended by
the Education Department to more narrowly tailor the
disclosure of online student data (making it more
equivalent to traditional directory information in the
educational record) that is shared with commercial
online operators, or at least require parental consent. 179
Third party operators should not be authorized as
educational partners under PPRA, because PPRA
allows them to use student PII commercially as long as
parental consent was obtained. 180 Also, COPPA needs
to be amended to remove the school exemption of thirdparty operators who are deemed educational partners, to
make them liable to COPPA enforcement, which would
allow the FTC to impose strict monetary fines and
policy changes on commercial companies that are
178

Id.
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 472.
180
Alexis M. Peddy, Dangerous Classroom “App”titude: Protecting Student Privacy from Third-Party Educational
Service Providers, 2017 BYU Educ. & L.J. 125, 138 (2017).
179
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found to be violators. 181 COPPA could also be
expanded to include students up to age eighteen. In
California, SOPIPA could be amended to include
companies not necessarily “targeting K-12 students,”
but who have services that K-12 students clearly use;
and the definition of “targeted advertising” could be
clearer. 182 The CCPA should apply to the sharing of
data, not only the sale of data, and the default should be
to opt out (rather than putting the burden on consumers
to opt out). 183 Also, rules against the selling of
“deidentified” information in all regulations needs to be
stricter, since companies can still piece together
disaggregated data and use it to create personal profiles.
Policymakers may set underlying legal
protections for appropriate data collection and use by
governments, businesses, organizations, and other
entities that collect, process, and share young peoples’
data. 184 Key considerations under debate include
determining the appropriate age of digital consent,
providing consent rights to the parent or the child,
promoting a consent-based or rights-based framework,
and relying on comprehensive or sector-based
legislation. 185 A partnership between the American
Civil Liberties Union and the Tenth Amendment Center
is providing model legislation for states to adopt to
strengthen data privacy protections for students. 186 In
particular, the legislation aims to strengthen these four
areas: 1) parental consent to release student data for
Rhoades, supra note 1, at 471.
See Crocetti, supra note 108, at 28-29.
183
See Castelo, supra note 118.
184
Jasmine Park & Amelia Vance, Youth Privacy and
Data Protection 101, STUDENT PRIV. COMPASS (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://studentprivacycompass.org/youth-privacy-and-dataprotection-101/.
185
Id.
186
Doran, supra note 19.
181
182
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noneducational purposes to third parties; 2) limits on
information gleaned from laptop loaners; 3) protection
from warrantless searches of student personal electronic
devices on campus; and 4) restricting access to student
postings behind social media privacy settings. 187
Unfortunately, softer solutions, such as encouraging
companies to sign the Student Privacy Pledge, seem
ineffective. The Pledge is a voluntary pledge to protect
student privacy regarding the collection, maintenance,
and use of student personal information. 188 The purpose
is to encourage service providers to more clearly
articulate their practices, and over 300 companies have
signed on. 189 Among the high-profile signatories are
Google, Microsoft, and Apple. However, conspicuously
absent are Pearson, the largest education textbook
publisher and a major distributor of online education
services, and Facebook. 190 An analysis of the privacy
policies and terms of service for eight companies who
signed the Student Privacy Pledge revealed that most
were not actually in compliance with the pledge. 191
Apple had the most potential violations, and most of the
companies in the analysis had potential violations when
it came to the collection, maintenance, and use of
student information. 192
Another key area for policymakers is to require
and fund privacy literacy in K-12 schools. For example,
in California, a state senator introduced an unfunded
187

Id.
Brenda Leong, K-12 Student Privacy Pledge
Announced, FUTURE OF PRIV. FORUM (Oct. 7, 2014),
https://fpf.org/press-releases/k-12-student-privacy-pledgeannounced/.
189
Student Privacy Pledge 2020 Signatories, FUTURE OF
PRIV. FORUM (2020). https://studentprivacypledge.org/signatories/.
190
See id.
191
Pfeffer-Gillett, supra note 16, at 102.
192
Id. at 113-16.
188
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digital citizenship and media literacy bill to require the
state superintendent of public instruction to convene a
committee of educators, librarians, parents, students,
and media experts to draw up guidelines on how best to
recognize fake news. 193 Something similar could be
done for privacy literacy. Privacy literacy has been
operationalized as recognizing how personal data and
metadata are collected, along with the potential
implications; assessing how personal data is shared and
making informed, intentional choices to safeguard
privacy; identifying privacy issues facing our society;
and describing the positive case for privacy as a human
right fundamental to individual well-being. 194 Other
researchers define privacy literacy as having six
dimensions: 1) knowledge of the practices of online
service providers, institutions, and organizations; 2)
technical aspects of online privacy and data protection;
3) knowledge of potential privacy threats and risks; 4)
knowledge of laws and legal aspects; 5) strategies for
individual online privacy control; and 6) strategies for
dealing with privacy threats. 195 These definitions could
be a starting point for drawing up guidelines.

Carolyn Jones, Bill would help California schools
teach about ‘fake news,’ media literacy. EDSOURCE (May 24,
2017), https://edsource.org/2017/bill-would-help-californiaschools-teach-about-fake-news-media-literacy/582363.
194
Sarah Hartman-Caverly & Alexandria Chisholm,
Privacy Literacy Instruction Practices in Academic Libraries:
Past, Present, and Possibilities, 46 IFLA J, 305, 316 (2020).
195
Sabine Trepte, Doris Teutsch, Philipp K. Masur,
Carolin Eichler, Mona Fischer, Alisa Hennhöfer, & Fabienne Lind,
Do People Know About Privacy and Data Protection Strategies?
Towards the “Online Privacy Literacy Scale” in Reforming
European Data Protection Law, 347-51 (Serge Gutwirth, Ronald
Leenes, & Paul de Hert, eds., 2015).
193
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B. Implications for School Officials

Privacy protection should be a shared responsibility
among school districts, educational technology
companies, and state boards of education. 196 School
officials need to insist that EdTech companies be more
transparent, be held to greater accountability, and offer
greater security for student data. All apps and websites
should encrypt student data to protect them from
“forces outside of the resource” as a starting point. 197
More uniform regulation of terms of service, including
where and for how long data is used and stored, should
occur; and data retention policies should be adjusted to
address service provider contracts and the deletion of
personal online data when no longer needed. 198 Having
privacy specialists review contracts with educational
technology providers so schools can publish a privacy
notice explaining how information is collected and used
would be ideal. 199
Schools can put pressure on EdTech companies
to embed privacy protections in the design, operation,
and management of their products and services. One
example is applying Ann Cavoukian’s “7 Foundational
Principles,” which include: 1) being proactive and
preventive rather than reactive and remedial; 2)
protecting privacy by default; 3) fully integrating
privacy into systems; 4) retaining full functionality of
services; 5) ensuring end-to-end security; 6)
maintaining visibility and transparency; and 7) keeping
things user-centric. 200 The Future of Privacy Forum
See El-Khattabi, supra note 17, at 535.
Zimmerle, supra note 11, at 6.
198
Huffman, supra note 61.
199
See generally, id.
200
Park, supra note 188.
196
197
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(FPF) and 23 other organizations released Education
During a Pandemic: Principles for Student Data
Privacy and Equity, containing 10 recommendations for
schools as they rely on new technologies and data. 201 A
key recommendation was for all technology and
subsequent data use to be evidence-based, evaluated for
efficacy, in alignment with all applicable laws, only be
deployed in consultation with experts and community
stakeholders, and only allow the use of school or
district-approved technologies in the classroom. 202
Other recommendations included suggestions to only
collect necessary health data, create transparent data
governance policies, and limit the sharing of personal
information with authorities to a narrowly-tailored and
documented purpose in accordance with applicable
statutes and regulations. 203
Districts can contract with chief privacy officers
(CPOs) or certified information privacy professionals
(CIPPs). 204 If schools lack funding for outside vetting,
they can develop in-house vetting through free
resources such as toolboxes with pre-vetted online
products, searchable repositories of reviews, and
iKeepSafe’s list of resources that are compliant with
key privacy laws. 205 Board participation on state
privacy or data commissions should include
establishing guidelines for the proper training of staff
who handle personal student digital data. 206 More
professional development is needed for teachers to
better understand basic student data privacy
201
Education During a Pandemic: Principles for Student
Data Privacy and Equity, STUDENT PRIV. COMPASS, (Oct. 27,
2020), https://studentprivacycompass.org/pandemicprinciples/.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Zimmerle, supra note 11, at 10.
205
Id. at 7-9.
206
El-Khattabi, supra note 17, at 535.
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concepts. 207 Some organizations that offer helpful
privacy educational resources include Our Data Bodies,
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Library Freedom
Project. 208 Also, the Teaching Privacy project is a set of
educational tools to help teachers demonstrate privacy,
and Common Sense Media offers a digital citizenship
curriculum aimed at K-12 that includes privacy
modules. 209
National or regional associations, state boards of
education, and state education departments can work to
create stronger standards that incorporate privacy
literacy. The International Society for Technology in
Education (ISTE) currently has “ISTE Standards for
Students,” which include a digital citizen component
stating “students manage their personal data to maintain
digital privacy and security and are aware of datacollection technology used to track their navigation
online.” 210 A conceptual framework for K-12 for the
closely related subfield “artificial intelligence literacy”
was recently published, and competency number 16, on
ethics, includes user privacy. 211 Similarly, the “AI for
K12” working group published a draft set of standards
for K-12 classrooms around artificial intelligence
Doran, supra note 19.
See Data Justice and Human Rights, OUR DATA
BODIES, https://www.odbproject.org; see ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/; see LIBRARY FREEDOM,
https://libraryfreedom.org/.
209
See TEACHING PRIVACY, https://teachingprivacy.org/;
See Digital Citizenship Curriculum, COMMON SENSE EDUC.,
https://www.commonsense.org/education/digitalcitizenship/curriculum.
210
ISTE Standards for Students, ISTE (June 2016),
https://www.iste.org/standards/iste-standards-for-students.
211
Duri Long & Brian Magerko, What Is AI Literacy?
Competencies and Design Considerations, (Apr. 21, 2020) in Proc.
of the 2020 CHI Conf. on Hum. Factors in Computing Sys., at 7
https://doi.org/10.1145/3313831.3376727.
207
208
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literacy that encompasses five big ideas, the last of
which is the societal impact of artificial intelligence,
including the value tradeoff for giving away one’s
data. 212 These can serve as a starting point for infusing
privacy literacy more formally into the curriculum.
C. Implications for Students and Parents

Both students and parents need to develop greater
awareness of data surveillance and the fact that personal
information is collected online about people, often
without their permission. Children and their parents
should be informed, in an accessible manner, about how
their data will be used, and what rights they have
through digital literacy lessons, such as in bite-sized
explanations, just-in-time notices, cartoons, videos, or
gamified content. 213 Children also need to develop
greater awareness of the impact of behavioral ads, so
they are not prone to fraudulent information and
propaganda. Researchers found that students in public
and private schools struggled in their ability to
effectively evaluate and verify social and political
information online.214 Successful privacy protection
behaviors were identified as such things as frequently
changing settings, so that content is only visible to
David S. Touretzky, Christina Gardner-McCune, Fred
Martin, & Deborah Seehorn, K-12 Guidelines for Artificial
Intelligence: What Students Should Know (June 23-26, 2019), in
Proc. of the ISTE Conf. at 32 (June 23-26, 2019),
https://uocsweb03.uocslive.com/ISTE/ISTE2019/PROGRAM_SE
SSION_MODEL/HANDOUTS/112142285/ISTE2019Presentation
_final.pdf.
213
Park, supra note 188.
214
Sarah McGrew, Joel Breakstone, Teresa Ortega, Mark
Smith & Sam Wineburg, Can Students Evaluate Online Sources?
Learning From Assessments of Civic Online Reasoning, 46
THEORY & RSCH. IN SOC. EDUC. 165, 183 (2018).
212
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specific people; using fake information online, such as
a fake name; blocking, deleting, or deactivating
cookies; and monitoring which information is available
about oneself online.215 These are behaviors that
parents and students can be encouraged to adapt.
It is worth noting that richer school districts can
afford to employ people to deal with privacy and
cybersecurity compliance, in order to choose digital
products that protect student privacy, whereas poorer
school districts may not have the resources to do so,
making student privacy a social justice issue.216 Lowincome students are more likely to need school-issued
computers for homework, and are, thus, more likely to
bear the brunt of surveillance policies that allow a
school to extend their reach into a student's home.217
Furthermore, IP addresses are often matched with real
estate data by online platforms to customize
advertising,218 meaning that students in less affluent
neighborhoods receive different, and often predatory,
advertisements. School resource officers who rely on
educational and surveillance technologies should be
aware of these inherent biases.

215
Moritz Büchi, Natascha Just & Michael Latzer, Caring
is Not Enough: The Importance of Internet Skills for Online
Privacy Protection, 20 INFO., COMMC’N & SOC’Y 1261, 1267
(2016).
216
Ashley Gold, Online Learning’s Toll on Kids’ Privacy,
AXIOS (Sept. 16, 2020). https://www.axios.com/childrens-privacysuffers-as-school-goes-online-321b010a-1319-4028-b45646a0a47f8920.html.
217
Fedders, supra note 3, at 1716.
218
See Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How
Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy 144
(2016).
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The purpose of this paper was to explore
student privacy in the context of big data and
educational data mining, especially the mining of
student data by third party commercial companies.
There is growing concern that current student
privacy regulations are inadequate, given the
changing technology landscape. This paper gave a
historical overview of key regulations and case law
related to student privacy and discussed the extent to
which student data is still largely unprotected from
third parties. It concluded with implications for
policymakers, school officials, and parents who want
to be more attentive in protecting children from this
form of exploitation for commercial gain by EdTech
companies.
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